Why Electronic Voting Isn’t Fully Secure — But May Still Be Safe Enough

As governments explore digitizing democratic processes, electronic voting (e-voting) continues to draw both enthusiasm and criticism. A widely cited article by Nate Kobie in The Guardian titled “Why electronic voting isn’t secure – but may be safe enough” (2015) examines the paradox at the heart of this technology: e-voting systems cannot be perfectly secure, but under the right conditions, they might still offer acceptable levels of safety and usability for specific election scenarios.

This article revisits the key themes of Kobie’s piece, evaluating its relevance today and connecting it with current cryptographic advances and practical deployments.

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The Security Problem: Inherent Risks of E-Voting

Kobie’s article begins by acknowledging a fundamental truth in cybersecurity: no software-based system is ever 100% secure. For e-voting, this includes vulnerabilities such as:

• Malware on voting machines or personal devices
• Exploitable bugs in the software
• Insider threats from administrators
• Lack of voter-verifiable records

Unlike banking systems that allow for post-transaction audits and reversals, elections are irrevocable—a single exploit can compromise legitimacy.

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Trust and Transparency: Missing from Black Box Systems

The article criticizes opaque voting systems, especially those that rely on proprietary code or lack end-to-end verifiability. Voters must trust:

• That their vote was recorded correctly
• That it was stored and counted properly
• That it cannot be traced back to them

Systems without public auditability undermine that trust, even if no actual fraud occurs.

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When E-Voting May Be “Safe Enough”

Kobie introduces the notion that while e-voting may not meet ideal cryptographic standards, it can still be practically safe for certain use cases:

• Low-stakes elections, such as university or corporate board elections
• Voter-convenience scenarios, like remote overseas voting
• Mixed systems, where paper ballots are digitally scanned to combine auditability with efficiency

This pragmatic stance aligns with how Helios, for instance, is used: not in national elections, but in smaller, low-coercion environments where transparency and usability outweigh the risks of coercion or malware.

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Expert Views on Risk Management

Security experts quoted in the article, such as Dr. Vanessa Teague, stress the importance of paper trails, public scrutiny, and independent audits. These remain vital even as more sophisticated e-voting schemes, like VoteAgain or Civitas, introduce features such as coercion resistance and re-voting.

What the article underscores is that risk cannot be eliminated—only managed. Therefore, deployment must be context-sensitive, based on threat models and logistical constraints.

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10 Years Later: Is E-Voting Still “Safe Enough”?

In 2025, Kobie’s core argument still holds. Despite progress in cryptographic voting protocols:

• Adoption in high-stakes elections remains cautious
• Trust and transparency remain key barriers
• Cryptographic verifiability (e.g., in systems like Helios or VoteAgain) is still not widely deployed due to complexity

However, public awareness has increased, and researchers like Dr. Elizabeth A. Quaglia continue working on solutions that aim to balance usability, security, and verifiability. Explore her expert insights here.

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Conclusion: Security vs. Sufficiency in Digital Democracy

E-voting may never reach the level of invulnerability that national elections demand—but it doesn’t have to. For many cases, “secure enough” with safeguards, audits, and transparency can be an acceptable middle ground. What matters most is informed implementation, continuous scrutiny, and a flexible approach to balancing risk with accessibility.